Turkey and NATO in retrospect: hard to classify as a 'win-win' relationship part II - Turkey’s solo response to PKK terrorism: 'O NATO allies, where art thou?”, by Kibaroğlu, Mustafa
Turkish Foreign Policy
6
Turkey and NATO in Retrospect:
Hard to Classify as a “Win-Win” Relationship
Turkey’s Solo Response to PKK Terrorism:  
“O NATO Allies, Where Art Thou?”
PART  II
Mustafa KİBAROĞLU
Prof., BİLGESAM President, Dean of MEF University
In Part I, which was published in the 
previous issue of The Strategist, how 
Turkey’s membership in the NATO has 
created major obstructions in its fight 
against terrorism since the late 1970s 
was discussed by and large. 
Now, in Part II, how Turkish 
governments have found their own 
solutions, in one way or another, 
without tangible support coming from 
their allies will be the discussed in 
detail.




Impact of the War in the Gulf: “No-Fly-Zone” 
Becomes “Safe Haven” for PKK
In the aftermath of the short-lived war in Kuwait 
between the Coalition Forces and Iraq in March 
1991, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds had 
fled their country and sought refuge in Turkey and 
Iran. 
As a result of the declaration of ‘‘no-fly-zones’’ by 
the United States in the northern and the southern 
parts of Iraq, the creation of safe havens for the 
Iraqi Kurdish population turned out to become a 
serious security problem for Turkey. 
Because, the northern sectors of the Iraqi territory 
that fell into the scope of the no-fly zone enforce-
ment became a sanctuary for the PKK terrorists. 
Hence, the PKK started to use the northern Iraqi 
territory as a safe haven whereby it intensified its 
attacks on Turkish security forces and the popu-
lation. 
Saddam’s forces had left lots of light and heavy 
weaponry and their munitions behind them when 
they were forced to retreat from the region after 
the victory of the Coalition Forces led by the United 
States in 1991. 
The PKK terrorists not only seized these weapons 
and munitions but also benefited from the lack of 
authority in northern Iraq to gain many more recru-
its. They also increased their revenues by control-
ling the arms and drug trafficking between Central 
Asia and Europe during the first half of the 1990s.
Turkey felt the need both to reorganize and to rest-
ructure its security forces and also needed special 
arms and technological products, such as remote 
sensors, night vision cameras, and the like to pro-
perly fight the terrorist organization. 
The Winds of Change in Eastern Europe Take 
Precedence over Turkey’s Role
However, the early 1990s were also the years of 
great transformations in Europe where concepts 
like human rights, cultural rights, and ethnic diver-
sity have started to gain supremacy in the political 
discourse across the continent. 
The Paris Act of 1990, which was a fundamental 
document making powerful references to these 
concepts, was also started to be adopted by all 
nations in Eastern as well as Western Europe. 
Similarly, in the United States, Democrat Party 
came to power with the November 1992 elections. 
The Clinton administration, like its European coun-
terparts, also paid a lot of attention to the democ-
ratic norms and values in its relations with other 
nations, including Turkey. 
Some of Turkey’s requests for military sales were 
either denied or delayed by the US Congress on 
the grounds of the criticisms of especially the De-
mocrat Senators.
Turkey had encountered serious difficulties in get-
ting support of the European nations, and of the 
United States, to a lesser degree, in its fight against 
the PKK. 
Most Europeans tended to see the PKK terrorism 
more as a result of ‘‘a lack of democratic norms 
and values in Turkey.’’ 
Therefore, political interest groups and nongovern-
mental organizations as well as some political par-
ties have started to put pressure on the European 
governments to impose a ban on the arms sales 
to Turkey. 
They were concerned with the possibility of use of 
these arms, if sold to Turkey, against the ‘‘Kurdish 
freedom fighters’’. 
Some of these allegations have gone as far away 
as to assert that, for instance, if Norway sold the 
Penguin anti-ship missiles to Turkey, the Turkish 
Army could use them against the Kurds. 
Beside the irrationality of any such allegations, one 
has to bear in mind that the Penguin missiles were 
anti-ship missiles and they could only be found in 
the inventory of the navies. Penguin missiles would 
have no use, if at all, in any counterterrorist opera-
tions.
Military Cooperation with Israel: Critical 
Partnership Against Terrorism
In such an international atmosphere where most 
of Turkey’s allies in NATO have denied critical arms 
supplies, Israel emerged as a country that could 
provide all such arms and technical devices that 
Turkey would need in its fight against the PKK. 
Israel also provided Turkey with critical and sound 
actionable intelligence about the movements and 
the logistical capabilities of the PKK terrorists. As 
such, the value of military cooperation with Israel 
at the operational level has been tremendous and 
helped Turkey gain the upper hand in the fight aga-
inst the PKK.
One should bear in mind that the force posture of 
the Turkish military during the Cold War years was 
heavily determined with the threat perception of the 
authorities who had assigned considerably more 
emphasis to the northeastern part of the country 
bordering the Soviet Union as well as the nort-
hwestern part bordering the Warsaw Pact member 
Bulgaria. 
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Developments Enabling Turkey to Change its Force Posture Toward M. East 
A series of developments have either compelled or enabled Turkey to make drastic changes in its force 
posture and the deployment of its military capabilities inside the country.
First of these developments was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, which forced the Turkish 
military and the security elite to be seriously concerned with the possible consequences of the ensuing 
events thereof. 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Turkey was quick to take political, military, and economic countermeasures 
both unilaterally and along with the international community in conformity with the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolutions.
The United States also asked Turkey to increase the level of its troop 
concentration along the Iraqi border in order to increase pressure on 
the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein who was then seemingly not very 
much affected from the reactions to his invasion of Kuwait coming 
from various parts of the world. 
Both as a preliminary measure against the threats posed by the atti-
tude of the Iraqi leader toward Turkey and to satisfy the expectations 
of the United States, Turkey decided to increase the level of troop 
deployment in its southeast. 
The recent collapse of the Warsaw Pact had eased the degree of 
the threat perceived from Bulgaria. Thus, approximately 100,000 
mechanized troops were transferred from the Bulgarian border to 
the southeastern part of Turkey, and they were deployed mainly 
along the Iraqi border.
Both as a preliminary 
measure against the 
threats posed by the 
attitude of the Iraqi leader 
toward Turkey and to 
satisfy the expectations of 
the United States, Turkey 
decided to increase the 
level of troop deployment 
in its southeast. 
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Collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Entry into Force of the CFE Treaty
The second development that enab-
led Turkey to go toward making dras-
tic changes in its force posture was 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
in December 1991 and the emergence 
of independent states across Turkey’s 
northeastern border. These historic de-
velopments enabled the Turkish secu-
rity elite to reassess the threats percei-
ved from the region. 
The elimination of the possibility of a 
large-scale surprise attack of the Red 
Army made it unnecessary to allocate 
the bulk of the Turkish military capabili-
ties toward Soviet Union any more. 
Hence, the possibility of shifting the mi-
litary units away from the northeastern 
frontier was much welcomed both by 
the political and by the security circles 
in Turkey.
The third development was the imple-
mentation of the Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was nego-
tiated between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact countries starting with the Helsin-
ki Process in 1975 and all through the 
1980s, and entered into force in 1990. 
The CFE Treaty envisaged drastic cuts 
in the five categories of conventional 
force levels of the militaries on both si-
des of the Iron Curtain. These five cate-
gories were main battle tanks, armored 
personnel vehicles, artilleries, attack 
helicopters, and combat aircraft. 
As a consequence of these develop-
ments, the military planners in Anka-
ra shifted their attention from Turkey’s 
northern neighbors Bulgaria and the 
Soviet Union to southern and eastern 
neighbors Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and re-
deployed the military units accordingly. 
In less than a decade, Turkey’s troop 
deployments in the region increased al-
most fivefold from a figure like 60,000 
infantry and gendarmerie troops in the 
early 1990s and reached a figure like 
300,000 in 1998, when a crisis erupted 
with Syria. 
Beside the numerical increase, the qu-
ality of the troops, including the Special 
Forces, also improved. New equip-
ment, such as light and heavy artillery, 
armored vehicles, and attack helicop-
ters were sent to the region, enabling 
the military to wage cross-border ope-
rations.
These deployments have been possible 
thanks to an exceptional arrangement 
in the CFE Treaty that increased Anka-
ra’s freedom of action in the region. 
In the context of the CFE Treaty, most 
part of Turkey’s southeast was left out-
side of the treaty limitations. This would 
mean that Turkey would not have to 
lower dramatically the number of its 
military assets in the five categories of 
weapons systems. 
Moreover, Turkey would be able to re-
ceive some of the excess weaponry 
from its NATO allies that would have to 
be dismantled due to the treaty obliga-
tions of these countries. Germany, for 
instance, sent some of its heavy armory 
to Turkey instead of dismantling them.
The increase both in quantity and in qu-
ality of Turkish military capabilities in its 
southeast, neighboring Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran, enabled Turkey to develop a new 
stance toward these countries, each 
of which has been a source of serious 
concerns with its military capabilities 
and political intentions.
In the second half of 1990s, the Turkish 
military has become capable of launc-
hing a comprehensive ground opera-
tion, on a short notice, with the invol-
vement of tens of thousands of troops 
fully equipped and mechanized. 
Added to this, the air power capabi-
lity could provide the troops on the 
ground with close air support through 
F-16 combat aircraft, and Sikorsky and 
Super Cobra attack helicopters. Ear-
ly warning aircraft (AWACS—Airborne 
Warning and Control System) as well as 
refueling aircraft that entered the inven-
tory of the Turkish Air Force increased 
both the range and the operational ca-
pability of the combat aircraft involved 
in operations. 
In the context of 
the CFE Treaty, 
most part of 
Turkey’s southeast 
was left outside 
of the treaty 
limitations. This 
would mean that 
Turkey would not 
have to lower 
dramatically the 
number of its 
military assets in 
the five categories 
of weapons 
systems. 
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Hence, the overall operational capability of the ground forces in 
combination with the air units is considered to give Turkey the 
capability to conduct large-scale military operation in the territory 
of the enemy, if need be, in a considerably short time.
Turkey’s Coercive Diplomacy Toward Syria
Turkey’s capability to retaliate thus constituted a credible deterrent 
against its southern neighbors. The impact of the increased troop 
deployment along southeastern borders of Turkey was clearly felt 
by the Syrian leadership during the short-lived crisis between the 
two countries in October 1998.
Confident with the ability to put enough military power behind its 
political claims, Turkey gave a precise ultimatum to Syria in Octo-
ber 1998. The official position of Turkey was publicly announced 
by the then President Süleyman Demirel during his speech on the 
opening day of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on October 
1, 1998. 
Prior to that, General Atilla Ateş, then Commander of the Land 
Forces, had made statements to that effect in front of the jour-
nalists right on the Turkish-Syrian border stressing the fact that 
Syria’s incessant support to the PKK could no more be tolerated. 
The message from the military and political wings of Turkey was 
clear: Syria should stop supporting the PKK and should expel 
Öcalan out of Syria. 
Close coordination between the top politicians and the Turkish 
General Staff as well as the proper use of the public diplomacy 
made it clear that this time Turkey was both ready and capable of 
coercing Syria to act along the lines of its, indeed decades-old, 
request.
Turkey’s capability 
to retaliate thus 
constituted a 
credible deterrent 
against its southern 
neighbors. The 




borders of Turkey 
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the Syrian leadership 
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lived crisis between 
the two countries in 
October 1998.
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Both Syria and the Arab League acknowledged the 
severity of the situation. Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak visited Ankara and Damascus and tried 
to prevent a war between Turkey and Syria. 
Hafez Al Assad was a very clever and pragmatic le-
ader. He was aware of the possible consequences 
of Syria’s continuing support to the PKK. Not only 
was Turkey powerful militarily, but also Syria had 
lost the support of the Soviet Union. The Russian 
Federation was not willing to take strong measures 
against Turkey. 
Considering all these, Syria took a rational decisi-
on as expected, and expelled Öcalan out of Syria. 
Öcalan’s journey, which had stopovers in Moscow, 
Rome, and the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, 
ended in a prison in Turkey. Öcalan was given a fair 
trial and sentenced to life for treason and commit-
ting various crimes, including terrorism. 
Syria signed the ‘‘Adana Protocol’’ later in 1998 
with Turkey committing itself not to give any more 
support to any groups that would damage the na-
tional interests of Turkey. End of story!!
Conclusion
The purpose of telling this “story” was not simply 
to express resentments toward the NATO allies for 
not having properly supported Turkey in the past in 
its fight against the PKK, both inside and outside 
its territory, as well as against the countries whose 
manifold support to the PKK has long served as its 
center of gravity.
The essential purpose was to emphasize that, des-
pite being labeled as a “staunch ally” by the other 
members of NATO, Turkey had to carry out a tre-
mendous job in fighting against the PKK and to 
sustain it for nearly three decades without enough 
tangible support coming from the allied and friend-
ly countries, not to mention some of their obstru-
ctions that diminished the operational capability of 
the Turkish security forces.
More than 40 thousand people have lost their lives 
during the fight between the Turkish security forces 
and the PKK terrorists, including nearly 7 thousand 
security personnel and almost an equal number 
of civilian Turkish citizens. More than 25 thousand 
PKK terrorists were killed in this fight, many of 
whom were citizens of Turkey. 
Among the civilians who lost their lives, in the or-
der of hundreds, were teachers, doctors, engine-
ers, technicians and other public servants who-
se sole purpose was to help improve the quality 
of life as well as to provide the basic services to 
the people living in the backwarded districts of the 
country. Many of them volunteered to go that regi-
on knowing the fatal implications of their choices.
Their peers, due to the manifold difficulties that the 
country was passing through, would not easily rep-
lace those who were fallen. The military officers of 
the Turkish Armed Forces have thus become the 
substitutes for them in teaching at schools, pro-
viding healthcare, and other day-to-day services. 
This behavior is nowadays called “winning the he-
arts and minds” of the local population, something 
that the Turkish security units had long been per-
forming during their fight against terrorism for de-
cades without necessarily attaching any particular 
label to it.
Hence, security experts covering NATO-related 
issues should better be studying Turkey’s abo-
ve-mentioned experiences closely in order to draw 
some precious lessons that would surely have 
relevance to the global fight against transnational 
terrorist organizations, instead of calling Turkey’s 
membership into question and recklessly sugges-
ting its discharge from the Alliance.
Syria took a rational decision 
as expected, and expelled 
Öcalan out of Syria. Öcalan’s 
journey, which had stopovers 
in Moscow, Rome, and the 
Greek Embassy in Nairobi, 
Kenya, ended in a prison in 
Turkey. Öcalan was given a fair 
trial and sentenced to life for 
treason and committing various 
crimes, including terrorism. 
